Using cross country data we show that tax evasion and corruption are highly important for determining the size of the …scal multiplier. We introduce these two features in a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions, in order to revisit the e¤ects of tax and expenditure based consolidations. VAR evidence for Italy suggests that expenditure based consolidations reduce tax evasion signi…cantly, while tax based ones increase it. In the model, expenditure cuts reduce demand for both formal and informal goods, and, thus, tax evasion. Tax hikes induce agents to work and produce more in the informal sector, which is less productive, and so imply higher output and welfare losses. We use the model to assess the losses from the recent …scal consolidation plans in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Policy conclusions are sensitive to the models assumptions. Counterfactual exercises highlight the bene…t of …ghting tax evasion and corruption in economies undertaking …scal consolidation.
Introduction
When there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust less on the same amount of income. Plato, The Republic, Book I, 343-D The recent …scal crisis has excited renewed interest in research examining the macroeconomic impacts of …scal consolidations. 1 Besides this increasing attention, two crucial political economy aspects, namely the presence of tax evasion and corruption, have been left unnoticed. This is despite the fact that many countries undertaking such policies are characterized by high levels of both. 2 Tax evasion and corruption often coexist, in various forms, and possibly interact. Existing evidence suggests a positive correlation between the two ). At the same time, there is growing evidence of a rise in tax evasion and corruption since the crisis. For example, a recent report by the union of the technical sta¤ of the Finance Ministry of Spain (Gestha (2014) ) calculates that the shadow economy has increased by 6.8 pp between 2008 and 2012, reaching 24.6% of GDP. Similarly, a Greek Police special task force reported in 2013 that the number of cases of public corruption increased by 33% between 2011 and 2012. 3 The aim of this paper is to consider these two features and revisit the e¤ects of expenditure based (EB) and tax based (TB) …scal consolidations on output, unemployment and welfare.
More speci…cally, we will consider tax evasion as synonymous with the shadow economy, which comprises "all market-based, lawful production or trade of goods and services deliberately concealed from public authorities in order to evade either payment of income, value added or other taxes, or social security contributions; to get around certain labor market standards, such as minimum wages, maximum working hours, or safety standards; or to avoid compliance with administrative procedures, such as …lling out paperwork" , p.175-176).
Fiscal policy can a¤ect the size of the shadow economy by exerting an impact on the incentives to tax evade, both directly through the tax burden, and indirectly through its e¤ects on the regular economy. Thus, a …scal consolidation can have a secondary e¤ect on the economy by causing a reallocation between the formal and informal sector. We will consider corruption as the embezzlement of public funds, the presence of which can have important implications for the ability of governments to raise tax revenue, and so can alter the e¤ects of …scal consolidations.
Many authors have tried to assess whether EB and TB …scal consolidations have di¤erent e¤ects. Using multi-year …scal consolidation data for 17 OECD countries over the period 1980-2005, Alesina et al. (2013) show that EB adjustments have been associated with mild and shortlived recessions, and in many cases with no recession at all, while TB corrections have been followed by deep and prolonged recessions. On the theoretical front, Erceg and Lindé (2013) demonstrate via a two-country Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model that, given the limited accommodation by the central bank and the …xed exchange rates under a currency union, an EB 1 The implementation of the Maastricht Treaty back in the mid 1990s motivated a lot of research on the e¤ects of consolidations. For examples, see the survey in Perotti (1996) . 2 See Figure 11 in Appendix A. 3 See http://greece.greekreporter.com/2013/04/02/greek-police-public-worker-corruption-soars/ 2 consolidation depresses output by more than a TB one, but this is reversed in the long run as real interest and exchange rates adjust towards their ‡exible price levels.
Nonetheless, there is strong evidence that the e¤ects of …scal policy are not yet fully understood. Blanchard and Leigh (2013) , BL (2013) hereafter, carry out an analysis of the impact of the recent …scal consolidations across 26 OECD countries. They regress the forecast errors of output growth between 2010-2011 on the planned consolidation of public de…cit, and …nd that the forecasts of output growth implicitly underestimate the size of …scal multipliers. As we demonstrate in the next section, this implicit underestimation of …scal multipliers is more pronounced in countries with higher shadow economy and/or corruption, suggesting that these two features amplify the e¤ects of …scal consolidations. among the 27 EU members in the recently created index for the 'Quality of Government' (see Charron et al. (2012) ). 4 We use the ISTAT data on shadow employment to assess the e¤ects of TB and EB consolidations at least in Italy. In particular, we incorporate the shadow employment series in an annual VAR with government expenditure, tax revenues, a series for the debt-to-GDP ratio, and either real GDP or the unemployment rate as a measure of economic activity. We identify EB and TB consolidation shocks using sign restrictions: EB consolidations decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio with a lag and leave tax revenues unchanged on impact, while TB consolidations also decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio with a lag and leave government spending unchanged on impact. We …nd that both types of shocks are contractionary, in terms of reducing output and increasing unemployment. Moreover, TB consolidations cause a signi…cant increase in tax evasion, while EB consolidations reduce tax evasion signi…cantly. Results are robust to the method used to identify …scal shocks, to the number of variables entering the VAR, and to alternative measures of the …scal instruments.
In order to understand the mechanisms which drive these results we introduce tax evasion and corruption in a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions and endogenous labor force participation, and reassess the e¤ects of …scal consolidations. The economy is divided into a regular and an underground sector, and none of the transactions in the latter are recorded by the government authorities. Firms can therefore hire labor in the underground markets to hide part of their production and evade payroll taxes. Households may also evade personal income taxation by reallocating their labor supply to the underground sector, but without being entitled to unemployment bene…ts whilst searching in this sector. In each period of time, there is a positive probability that irregular employment is detected, in which case the match is dissolved and the …rm pays a …ne. Following Erceg and Lindé (2013), we specify either labor tax rates or government consumption expenditure to react to the deviation of the debt-to-GDP ratio from a target value.
Fiscal consolidation occurs when the target value of debt is hit by an exogenous negative shock.
The model is calibrated to the Italian economy over the period 1982-2006. According to our model, the presence of tax evasion and corruption ampli…es the negative e¤ects of TB consolidations on output, while it mitigates those of EB consolidations. The presence of corruption implies that a bigger increase in distortionary taxation is needed to achieve consolidation, and this ampli…es the negative e¤ects of tax hikes. Tax evasion increases the output losses after a TB consolidation because both workers and …rms, in their e¤ort to avoid taxation, reallocate more resources to the underground sector, increasing ine¢ ciencies arising from the fact that this sector is less productive, and also because tax evasion implies that a higher increase of the tax rate is required to meet the debt target. On the other hand, government spending cuts induce a fall in tax evasion. Spending cuts generate a negative demand e¤ect that a¤ects both formal and informal production. Rather than observing a reallocation of labor supply and labor demand between the two sectors, the EB consolidation induces unemployed jobseekers in both sectors to leave the labor force. Labor demand is also contracted and as a result both formal and informal employment fall. Since reductions in government consumption crowd-in private consumption and decrease the labor supply, EB consolidations typically involve welfare gains, whereas TB consolidations are costly in terms of welfare. Relative to standard models, tax evasion and corruption increase the size of the wealth e¤ect from reductions in government spending and therefore induce smaller output losses and even higher welfare gains from spending cuts, while their presence implies higher output and welfare losses from TB consolidations.
Given the model's ability to match the empirical …ndings, we also analyse, through the lens of our model, the actual consolidation plans in Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal) that are characterized by both high corruption and tax evasion. We calibrate our model for di¤erent economies and show how the recent …scal consolidations a¤ect tax evasion in each country according to our model. We then assess the size of output, unemployment and welfare losses from the simulated consolidations. The higher levels of the debt-to-GDP ratio in Italy and Greece imply that the required changes in de…cit are larger in these countries. As a result, the model predicts that the output losses and increases in unemployment and the shadow economy are more pronounced in Greece and Italy. In terms of welfare, results depend on the assumptions one is willing to accept about the composition of spending and population in these economies. If we assume government spending to be unproductive and agents identical in the economy, Italy stands out as the Southern European country most negatively a¤ected by …scal austerity, the other three countries gain from …scal consolidations in terms of welfare. If we are willing to accept that a big part of the population was …nancially constrained in these economies, then all countries lost from the …scal consolidations with Greece standing out as the bigger loser. Finally, if we believe that parts of the spending cuts involved utility enhancing goods, then again the model predicts welfare losses for all countries from the consolidations, with Spain being the country that su¤ered the least because of its low debt burden.
A lot of policy discussions have been centred around combating both tax evasion and corruption. For example, in May 2013, in Ljubljana, Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament organized an event focusing on corruption and tax evasion. We perform a counterfactual exercise and study what would be the losses from …scal consolidations if the Southern European countries were capable of reducing the degree of corruption and tax evasion in their economies. We …nd that both battles are worth …ghting. A reduction in corruption and tax evasion mitigates the losses from …scal consolidations. Following the conlcusions of our policy analysis we can humbly paraphrase the quote of Plato: When there is a corrupt government and an income tax, both the just and the unjust man will pay more, with the just man paying the lion's share on the same amount of income. Policymakers should realize that and take immediate action.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present empirical evidence to motivate our work. In Section 3 we …rst present the workhorse model and then discuss the main theoretical results. Section 4 presents the policy exercises and Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Evidence
In this section, we …rst extend the BL (2013) cross country regressions, exploiting the available estimates for corruption and the share of shadow output in total GDP to investigate their e¤ects on …scal policy outcomes. We then use the ISTAT data on shadow employment in Italy to run VAR regressions to further examine the e¤ects of EB and TB consolidations on output, unemployment and shadow employment.
A First Look at the Data
To motivate our study, we replicate the BL (2013) regressions, controlling for the size of the shadow economy and the extent of public corruption. For the size of the shadow economy we use estimates from Elgin and Öztunal¬(2012) , while for corruption we use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency International. 5 We separate the 26 European countries considered by BL (2013) into two groups with high and low shadow economy, or corruption, respectively.
by using a two-mean clustering algorithm to endogenously group the countries. 6 We then add, 5 The results are robust to the using other estimates, such as Schneider and Buehn (2012) for the shadow economy, or the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index for corruption. 6 The 'high shadow economy'group comprises Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain, while the 'low shadow economy'group includes Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Slovakia and the UK. The 'high corruption'group comprises Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain, while the 'low corruption' group includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the to the baseline regression of BL (2013), a dummy which is equal to one for the high corruption and tax evasion group. Finally, we also run the same regression using the intersection of the two groupings; in this case we drop three countries which do not fall into the same group across the two indices. 7 The results are shown in Table 1 .
The …rst column replicates the baseline result of BL (2013). The planned …scal consolidation variable is signi…cant at 1% and has a coe¢ cient of -1.095, implying that "for every additional percentage point of …scal consolidation as a percentage of GDP, output was 1 percent lower than forecast." (BL (2013), p.8) Whilst this coe¢ cient is still signi…cant at 5% when the dummy variables are included, we see that the coe¢ cients are much lower in absolute value, implying that for countries with low shadow economy and public corruption, the forecasts were more accurate.
On the other hand, the interaction term is always signi…cant, showing that there is a signi…cant di¤erence in the coe¢ cient across the two groups. The total coe¢ cient on the planned …scal con-UK. 7 An alternative way of carrying out this analysis would be to include the cross-section of the indices directly as controls in the regression. We have chosen to use the dummy variable approach because, although we have robust groupings of countries into high and low tax evasion and corruption, there is not enough cross-sectional variation in either index to add them directly in the regression and also because both measures are estimated raising issues of generated regressor bias for this exercise. 6 solidation is -1.431 for the High Shadow Economy group, -1.540 for the High Corruption group, and -1.518 for the High Shadow Economy and Corruption group. In all cases, this is well above the baseline BL (2013) coe¢ cient in absolute value, suggesting that the forecast errors were signi…cantly and systematically larger in these countries. In other words, the implicit underestimation of …scal multipliers is more pronounced in countries with higher shadow economy and/or corruption, suggesting that these two features amplify the e¤ects of …scal consolidations.
Following the analysis of BL (2013), we run the same regressions for the components of GDP and unemployment in order to understand which components of demand are more signi…cantly a¤ected by the presence of these two features. Table 2 summarizes the results. We see that the presence of corruption and tax evasion is particularly important for the e¤ects of consolidations on the unemployment rate and investment, but not for consumption, neither for exports or imports.
VAR Evidence
In this section we present VAR regressions for Italy, for which we have annual time series available for the size of the underground sector. The Italian statistical o¢ ce (ISTAT (2010)), calculates the number of employees working in the informal sector using the discrepancies between reported employment from household surveys and …rm surveys. We use the percentage of informal workers in total workers as the measure of the size of the shadow economy, and enter this into a VAR with GDP, government …nal consumption expenditures, tax rates (calculated as the total tax burden over GDP) and government debt-to-GDP ratio. 8 We also run the same VAR replacing GDP with the unemployment rate.
We use a set of minimal sign restrictions to identify the …scal disturbances. We identify two …scal shocks, a government spending and a tax shock that both decrease the debt-to-GDP ratio.
To do so, we impose that the debt-to-GDP ratio falls with a lag following both shocks. We use zero restrictions that ensure that in each case only one instrument is active during the consolidation.
In other words, to identify an EB consolidation we assume that tax rates do not move on impact after the shock, while the opposite is assumed in the case of a TB consolidation. The responses of output, unemployment and shadow employment are left unrestricted. The sign restrictions used are summarised in Table 3 . 9 The resulting impulse response functions for the VAR with output are shown in Figure 1 . 10 In the case of an EB consolidation both output and shadow employment decrease signi…cantly at all horizons. For a TB consolidation, output does not fall on impact but is signi…cantly negative 8 The ISTAT data is available at http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/39522. All other data are taken from the AMECO database of the European Commission. We use annual data from 1980-2006, and de-trend the data by including in the VAR a cubic trend and a dummy for 1998 (the start of the European Monetary Union). We also include interest rates as an exogenous variable in order to control for the e¤ects of monetary policy. Given the small sample size, we use Bayesian methods to estimate the VAR. 9 As a robustness check, we run the VAR in the following order: government consumption expenditures, GDP, shadow employment, tax rates and debt-to-GDP, and use the Cholesky decomposition to identify the shocks. The results are shown in Appendix A, and are in line with the sign restrictions. These results need to be taken with caution since it is very di¢ cult to justify the zero restrictions assumed on the reaction of the …scal instrument to output changes on annual data. 1 0 For ease of exposition we show only the responses of the unrestricted variables in each case; the other responses are in line with the sign restrictions imposed and are presented in Appendix A . 
Expenditure Cut -0 -Tax Hike 0 + in the long run, and there is a signi…cant rise in shadow employment in the second period.
The results of the VAR with the unemployment rate are shown in Figure 2 . We see that the unemployment rate rises signi…cantly after both types of consolidation, and, as before, shadow employment falls in the case of an EB consolidation, and rises in the case of a TB consolidation.
We have also performed exercises, that we do not present here for economy of space, in which we de…ne the …scal variables in the VAR as percentages of GDP, we replace GDP with a common factor for economic activity and we include alternative series for the size of the shadow economy provided by Elgin and Öztunah (2012) . Results are robust to these changes.
Hence, the data robustly suggests that, for Italy, a consolidation through expenditure cuts leads to a fall in shadow employment, whilst a consolidation through tax hikes increases shadow employment. In the next section we construct a DSGE model with tax evasion and corruption and try to replicate these empirical …ndings in order to understand the transmission of …scal shocks when the economy operates under such frictions.
The Model
We consider a DSGE model with search and matching frictions, endogenous labor decisions, and sticky prices in the short run. Given that, in Section 2, we found no evidence that the presence of corruption and tax evasion is important for understanding the e¤ects of …scal consolidation on exports or imports, we consider a closed-economy model, thus, keeping the setup as simple 
Shadow Employment (%)
Tax Based Consolidation the employees of the shadow economy. As well as their labor income, the household rents out its private capital to the intermediate …rms, and purchases the …nal consumption good. The government collects taxes from the regular sector, embezzles a fraction of the revenues, and uses the remainder to …nance public expenditures and the provision of unemployment bene…ts.
Labor market
Following the literature on labor market frictions, we account for the imperfections and transaction costs in the labor market by assuming that jobs are created through a matching function. For j = F; I denoting the formal and informal sectors, we let j t be the number of vacancies and u j t the number of jobseekers in each sector. We assume matching functions of the form:
where we allow for di¤erences in the e¢ ciency of the matching process, j 1 , in the two sectors. In each sector we can de…ne the probability of a jobseeker being hired, hj t , and of a vacancy being …lled, f j t , as well as the market tightness, j t , as follows:
hj t
In each period, jobs in the formal sector are destroyed at a constant fraction, F , and m F t new matches are formed. The law of motion f formal employment, n F t , is thus given by:
In the informal sector there is an exogenous fraction of jobs destroyed each period, I , as well as a probability that an informal employee loses their job due to an audit, which we denote by .
Therefore the law of motion of informal employment, n I t , is given by:
Households
The representative household is made up of a continuum of in…nitely lived agents. The members of the household derive utility from leisure, which corresponds to the fraction of members that are out of the labour force, l t , and a consumption bundle, cc t , de…ned as:
is the private consumption bundle, made up of the consumption goods produced in the formal and informal sector. The elasticity of substitution between the private and public goods is given by 1 1 2 . 11 Similarly, the elasticity of substitution between the formal and informal consumption goods is given by 1 1 2
. The instantaneous utility function is given by:
where is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, > 0 is the relative preference for leisure, and ' is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply.
At any point in time a fraction n Ravn (2008) , the participation choice is modelled as a trade-o¤ between the cost of giving up leisure and the prospect of …nding a job. In particular, the household chooses the fraction of the unemployed actively searching for a job, u t , and the fraction which are out of the labor force and enjoying leisure, l t , so that:
The household chooses the fraction of jobseekers searching in each sector: a share s t of unemployed looks for a job in the underground, while the remainder, (1 s t ), seek employment in the formal
The household owns the capital stock, which evolves over time according to:
where is a constant depreciation rate and ! 2 k t+1 kt 1 2 k t are adjustment costs.
The intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
It is convenient to de…ne the marginal value to the household of having an additional member employed in the two sectors, as follows 12 :
where n F t , n I t and ct are the multipliers in front of (2), (3) and (9) respectively.
Production

Intermediate goods …rms
Intermediate goods are produced with two di¤erent technologies:
where A F t > A I t denote total factor productivities. That is, we assume that the informal production technology is less e¢ cient and uses labor inputs only (see e.g. Busato and Chiarini (2004) ).
More importantly, since households consume a …nal good, we are also implicitly assuming that the formal and informal goods are perfect substitutes. There is no di¤erentiation between goods.
Final goods are produced with some intermediates that are not declared by the …rms.
Firms maximize the discounted value of future pro…ts, subject to (2) and (3), taking the number of workers currently employed in each sector, n j t ; as given and choosing the number of vacancies posted in the current period in each sector, j t , so as to employ the desired number of workers next period, n j t+1 . Here, …rms adjust employment by varying the number of workers (extensive margin) rather than the number of hours per worker (intensive margin). According to Hansen (1985) , most of the employment ‡uctuations arise from movements in this margin. Firms also decide the amount of the private capital, k t , needed for production. They face a probability, , of being inspected by the …scal authorities, convicted of tax evasion and forced to pay a penalty, which is a fraction, , of their total revenues. Hence the problem of an intermediate …rm is:
where p x t is the relative price of intermediate goods, s t is a payroll tax, j is a cost associated with posting a new vacancy in each sector j, and t;t+1
is a discount factor. The …rst-order conditions are:
According to (15) Again for convenience we present the expected values of the marginal formal and informal job for the intermediate …rm:
Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers indexed by i on the unit interval. 
where > 1 is the constant elasticity of demand for retail goods. The …nal good is sold at its
The demand for each intermediate good depends on its relative price and aggregate demand:
Following Calvo (1983), we assume that in any given period each retailer can reset her price with a …xed probability (1 ) . Hence, the price index is:
The …rms that are able to reset their price, p it , choose it so as to maximize expected pro…ts given by:
The resulting expression for p it is:
Government
The government's expenditures consist of consumption purchases and unemployment bene…ts, whilst their revenue comes from the collected …nes and the payroll, consumption, and labor income taxes, as well as the lump-sum taxes. The government de…cit is therefore de…ned by:
where T R t ( n t + s t )w F t n F t + c t c t + T t represents the tax revenues and 0 T R < 1 denotes the embezzlement rate in the presence of corruption in the economy.
The government budget constraint is de…ned by:
where b t = Bt yt is the debt-to-GDP ratio and g y t+1 is the growth rate of GDP. We assume transfers, T t , ; s t ; and c t are …xed at their steady-state level. Therefore the government potentially has the following …scal instruments 2 fg; n g, in line with Erceg and Lindé (2013). Although we have tried to incorporate various types of distortionary taxation in our framework, we present results for the varying labor tax only since …scal consolidations through payroll tax hikes have very similar e¤ects in our model and since consumption tax hikes, though they have di¤erent e¤ects from the other two types of taxes, do not constitute the major source of tax revenues in any of the economies we study.
We consider each instrument separately, assuming that if one is active, the others remain …xed at their steady-state levels. Following Erceg and Lindé (2013), we assume …scal rules of the form:
where b t is the target value for this ratio and follows an AR(2) process:
Closing the model
Monetary Policy There is an independent monetary authority that sets the nominal interest rate as a function of current in ‡ation according to the rule:
where R is the steady-state value of the nominal interest rate.
Goods Markets Total output must equal private and public demand. The resource constraint for output is thus given by:
where the last term represents the resource costs in the economy due to corruption. 13 The aggregate price index, p t , is given by (22) and (23). The return on private capital, r t ,
adjusts so that the capital demanded by the intermediate goods …rm, given by (15) , is equal to the stock held by the household.
Bargaining over wages Wages in both sectors are determined by ex post (after matching) Nash bargaining. Workers and …rms split rents and the part of the surplus they receive depends on their bargaining power. For j = F; I we denote by # j 2 (0; 1) the …rms'bargaining power in sector j. The Nash bargaining problem is to maximize the weighted sum of log surpluses:
where V h n j t and V f n j t are de…ned in equations (10), (11), (18) and (19) . As shown in Appendix B.3, wages are given by:
Calibration
We calibrate the model using annual data on the Italian economy over the period 1982-2006. 14 Table 4 displays the values used for the di¤erent parameters. We calibrate the labor force participation and unemployment rate in the formal sector to match the observed average values from the data. Thus we set o¢ cial labor force participation, lf = n F + u F , equal to 60% and the o¢ cial unemployment rate to 10%. We …x the separation rate, F , equal to 0:07. Since there is no exact estimate for the value of the formal vacancy-…lling probability, f F , in the literature, we use what is considered as standard by setting it equal to 0:96. We set the matching elasticity with respect to vacancies, 2 , equal to 0:7, close to the estimate for Italy in Peracchi and Viviano (2004) .
The capital depreciation rate, , is set equal to 0:088. Following the literature, we set the discount factor, , equal to 0:96. The elasticity of demand for intermediate goods, , is set such that the gross steady-state markup, 1 , is equal to 1:25, and the price of the …nal good is normalized to one. The TFP parameter in the formal sector is normalized to one, A F = 1 and the capital share F = 0:34. The probability of audit and the fraction of total pro…ts paid as a …ne in the event of an audit are set as follows: = 0:02, which is close to the value used in Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), and = 0:3. We set the vacancy costs in the formal sector F = 0:14 and the payroll tax rate s = 0:16, close to the value in Orsi et al. (2014) .
In the informal sector, we assume that TFP is lower relative to the informal sector and set A I = 0:25. Using the ISTAT data, we set the share of underground employment to total employment equal to 0:13. We set the value of I equal to 0:8. We set the exogenous job destruction rate in the informal sector I = 0:0545 and set the probability of …lling a vacancy in the informal sector f I = 0:05 and the vacancy cost in the informal sector I = 0:13.
Next, we set the replacement rate, $ w F , equal to 0:35 close to the estimates in Martin (1996) , also used by Fugazza and Jacques (2004) . Government spending as a share of GDP and the tax rates are set as follows: g y = 11%, n = 0:4, in line with Orsi et al. (2014) , and c = 0:18. The steady state debt-to-GDP ratio is taken from the data, b = 103%. We set the corruption parameter T R = 0:2.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1 , is set equal to 0:5 and the inverse Frisch elasticity, ', equals 2. Finally, we set the in ‡ation targeting parameter in the Taylor rule, = 1:1, the capital adjustment costs ! = 3 and the price-stickiness parameter = 0:25. The …scal policy parameters are set so as to achieve a 5% drop in the debt-to-GDP target 10 periods after a debt shock.
Results
We now present the impulse responses following a negative debt-target shock. We compare the e¤ects of a 5% reduction in the desired long-run debt target, which is achieved after 10 years either through a fall in consumption expenditure or a hike in the tax rates.
Benchmark Model
In order to understand how tax evasion and corruption a¤ect the transmission of …scal shocks, we begin by analysing the response of the macroeconomy in a standard model where those two features are absent. The theoretical impulse responses are presented in Figure 3 .
The consolidation carried out with a fall in government spending has two channels. Firstly, there is a negative demand e¤ect, leading to a fall in labor demand, which is translated into a fall in vacancies. Secondly, there is a positive wealth e¤ect for the household, which increases consumption and investment and reduces labor force participation. Given the drop in both labor demand and supply, employment falls and the wage increases. Output falls in the short run, but increases in the medium and long run due to the increase in investment, which is translated into an increase in the capital stock. The unemployment rate re ‡ects the movement in the number of jobseekers, which falls on impact, but then increases as employment adjusts.
DEFICIT-TO-GDP RATIO
When the …scal consolidation is carried out through labor tax hikes, there is a negative wealth e¤ect for the household which reduces consumption. The fall in consumption induces a fall in labor demand, expressed through a drop in vacancies. However, as the return from employment falls, there is a substitution e¤ect which outweighs the wealth e¤ect, and there is again a decrease in labor force participation. Employment and output fall, and the responses are signi…cantly larger and more persistent than in the case of spending cuts, given the delayed drop in investment and, hence, capital.
Thus, the benchmark model con…rms recent empirical evidence according to which EB consolidations are accompanied by mild and short-lived recessions, while TB consolidation lead to more prolonged and deep recessions (see Alesina et al. (2013) ).
Model with Shadow Economy and Corruption
Next, we perform the same analysis for the economy with an underground sector and corruption. The negative demand e¤ect from spending cuts a¤ects both formal and informal production.
Rather than observing a reallocation of labor supply and labor demand between the two sectors, we see that unemployed jobseekers in both sectors decide to leave the labor force. Labor demand is again contracted and as a result, formal and informal employment fall, replicating the responses of the underground economy to a spending cut we observed for Italy in Subsection 2.2. well as a mixed consolidation in which we allow both policy instruments to move simultaneously. 15 We …x the relative contribution of expenditure cuts and revenue enhancements to the reduction in de…cit, based on the estimates of OECD (2012), which contains details of the recent …scal consolidation plans for many OECD countries. For Italy the reported share of expenditure cuts in the consolidation plans is around 50%.
Comparisons and Sensitivity Analysis
GROSS REAL INTEREST RATE
For spending cuts, shown in the top panel, we see that the presence of the shadow economy yields smaller short run losses of output and decreases the unemployment rate at all horizons.
At the same time, consumption increases by more, and labor force participation falls by more, relative to the benchmark case without tax evasion and corruption. This seems to suggest that the presence of tax evasion and corruption ampli…es the wealth e¤ect. This is due to the fact that, when tax evasion and corruption are present, the tax adjustments required to achieve a given change in de…cit are larger, and so, following a spending cut, taxes in the future are expected to fall by more. The ampli…cation of the wealth e¤ect increases the crowding-in of the private sector and reduces the negative demand e¤ect of the …scal contraction on output and unemployment.
We also see that in both models the EB consolidation implies welfare gains, and that allowing for tax evasion and corruption increases welfare from EB consolidations. This is simply because of the ampli…cation of the wealth e¤ect, which increases the crowding-in of private consumption and the reduction of labor force participation.
For tax hikes, shown in the middle panel, we see that the presence of corruption and tax evasion ampli…es the output losses for many horizons, as the recession caused in the formal sector is deeper. After the impact period, the rise in the o¢ cial unemployment rate is ampli…ed. Finally, we see that TB consolidation leads to welfare losses, due to the fall in consumption, which are ampli…ed by the presence of tax evasion and corruption.
For the mixed consolidation, depicted in the bottom panel, we see that, similarly to the case of TB consolidation, the output losses and the increases in unemployment are ampli…ed in the presence of tax evasion and corruption. This is in line with the evidence from our extension of the BL (2013) regressions in Section 2. Furthermore, the initial welfare gains are mitigated, but this is reversed after 6 years.
Whilst the e¤ects of TB consolidations are robust to a broad set of parameter values, the e¤ects of EB consolidations might depend crucially on some modelling assumptions. For instance, spending cuts can result in welfare losses if government expenditures are assumed to be utility enhancing. To investigate this, we conduct a sensitivity analysis by setting 1 = 0:85 and 2 = 0:25, so that private and public spending are complements. Results from an EB consolidation under this scenario are depicted in the top panel of Figure 7 in comparison to the case of wasteful government spending. 16 We see that output and unemployment e¤ects are mitigated, while, as expected, the response of welfare is reversed.
In addition, the presence of rule of thumb (ROT) consumers in the economy may imply smaller 
WELFARE
Benchmark Model Full Model
Tax Based Consolidation welfare gains from spending cuts, since these agents cannot adjust their consumption in the event of a consolidation and their presence mitigates the positive welath e¤ect induced by the …scal contraction. To explore this channel, we incorporate in our model a fraction of non-optimising household members, which we set in our calibration equal to 44% in accordance with household surveys for Italy reported by Martin and Philippon (2014) . As shown in the bottom panel of 
Policy Evaluation
Given that the model is able to replicate qualitatively the empirical responses of output, unemployment and tax evasion in Italy, in this section we employ it in order to quantify the e¤ects of actual …scal consolidation plans proposed and implemented in recent years. In particular, we recalibrate our model for Greece, Spain and Portugal, all countries which are implementing sizeable consolidations and which are characterized by high corruption and tax evasion. In this section we consider both the e¤ects of the consolidation plans on the size of the shadow economy, and also measure their output, unemployment and welfare e¤ects.
For this exercise, in order to replicate the actual consolidation plans proposed in these countries, we allow both policy instruments, g and n , to move simultaneously so as to bring the actual debt-to-GDP ratio down to the target after 10 years. We …x the relative contribution of expenditure cuts and revenue enhancements based on the estimates of OECD (2012), which contains details of recent …scal consolidation plans for many OECD countries. Thus, for each country, we set a policy mix in which a fraction a of the reductions in de…cit comes from expenditure cuts, and (1 a) from revenue enhancements. Table 5 summarises the values that di¤er in the calibration for the four economies of interest.
The size of both informal employment and corruption is higher in Italy and Greece, relative to Spain and Portugal and the same is true for the debt-to-GDP ratios. 17 These two countries have also smaller labor force participation rates, while the size of the government consumption expenditures as a percentage of GDP is higher in Italy but lower in the other countries. In terms of the consolidation packages, the mix between expenditure cuts and tax revenue increases looks similar across the four economies, except for Spain that was dominated by expenditure cuts.
The results are shown in Figure 8 . 18 The high level of the debt-to-GDP ratio in Italy and
Greece implies that the required changes in taxation and government consumption spending and, thus, de…cit, are larger in these countries. As a result, after the …scal consolidation, output drops and the shadow economy increases by more in Greece and Italy. The same is true for unemployment. Although the output and unemployment responses in Italy and Greece are similar,
Italy is the only country that su¤ers welfare losses in the medium run, as we saw in Figure 6 .
This is due to the lower share of expenditure cuts in the consolidation mix, a = 0:5, and therefore the higher increase in the tax rate, seen in the bottom left graph. In the other countries, …scal consolidations induce welfare gains. These welfare gains are higher in Portugal and Spain, where the lower debt-to-GDP ratio implies smaller …scal consolidations. For that reason, the e¤ects on output, unemployment and the shadow economy are qualitatively similar but quantitatively smaller than in Italy and Greece.
As we saw previously, the presence of ROT consumers or utility enhancing government expenditures can modify the predictions of the model regarding the welfare e¤ects of …scal consolidations.
For this reason, we examine the sensitivity of our policy evaluation conclusions when we incorporate these two features in our analysis. We use estimates for the fraction of ROT consumers across the four countries from Martin and Philippon (2014) , setting this parameter to 65% for Greece, 44% for Italy, 54% for Spain and 50% for Portugal. For the case of utility enhancing spending, we again set 1 = 0:85 and 2 = 0:25 for all countries. The responses of welfare in each case are shown in Figure 9 .
The introduction of rule-of-thumb consumers overturns our previous policy evaluation conclusions. First, the consolidation plans are associated with welfare losses for all countries, although it is again true that Spain and Portugal are less a¤ected relative to Italy and Greece. If we take into account the presence of …nancially constrained individuals in the economy, Greece is the big loser from …scal consolidation among these countries since its share of rule of thumb consumers is substantially higher relative to the other countries.
As expected, if government spending is assumed to complement private consumption, the welfare losses from …scal consolidations are large for all the countries we consider since in this case both spending cuts and tax hikes a¤ect negatively welfare. Under this scenario, the welfare losses from …scal consolidations are comparable in Greece, Italy and Portugal and are somewhat smaller in the case of Spain since the debt to GDP ratio is smaller in this country and smaller sacri…ces are needed to meet the debt target.
Given the emphasis in recent years on deterring tax evasion and corruption hand-in-hand with carrying out …scal consolidation, it is interesting to ask whether such reforms can change the Portugal e¤ects of the consolidation plans currently being implemented. In order to investigate this, we use our model to carry out a counterfactual experiment. In particular, we again simulate the …scal consolidation plans for the four economies, this time assuming that the auditing probability for tax evasion is double that of the previous calibration. Figure 10 depicts, for each country, the welfare losses in the baseline calibration with solid lines and when the auditing probability is higher with dashed lines. We see that since output losses are mitigated, for all of the countries, welfare gains are ampli…ed. Moreover, the medium-run welfare losses in Italy become welfare gains, given that …ghting tax evasion implies lower hikes in the tax rates needed to achieve the targeted consolidation.
In a similar manner, we carry out a counterfactual experiment, this time reducing by 50% the embezzlement rate, and so reducing the extent of corruption, in the underlying economies.
Welfare losses are depicted with dotted lines in Figure 10 . Reducing corruption improves welfare during the consolidations for all countries and most signi…cantly so for Italy, where medium run welfare losses become very small, and Greece, since these two countries are calibrated to have a higher degree of public corruption. These results suggest that there should be an emphasis on …ghting public corruption, particularly in the time of a consolidation, since output losses can be mitigated and welfare gains can be ampli…ed signi…cantly when healthier public institutions are in place.
Concluding Remarks
Cross country regressions suggest clearly that accounting for both tax evasion and corruption is key in understanding the e¤ects of …scal policy. Through a New Keynesian DSGE model with involuntary unemployment, an underground sector and corruption, we have been able to show that the presence of tax evasion and corruption ampli…es the contractionary e¤ects of tax based consolidations, whilst it mitigates the e¤ects of expenditure based ones. Moreover, the type of …scal consolidation a¤ects the incentives of agents to produce in the shadow sector. In particular, an expenditure based consolidations reduce the size of the shadow economy, whilst a tax based consolidations increase it. These results match VAR evidence for Italy for which data on informal employment exists.
Given the model's ability to reproduce qualitatively the data patterns, we proceed to analyse the output, unemployment and welfare e¤ects of actual …scal consolidation plans in Italy, Greece,
Spain and Portugal. Fiscal consolidations imply sizeable output and unemployment losses in
Greece and Italy, both because these countries are characterized by higher level of public corruption and tax evasion, and also because the debt burden in these countries is higher, requiring higher sacri…ces to achieve consolidation. Our policy conclusions depend on which assumptions one is willing to take on board as more realistic for describing these four economies. If government spending is assumed to be wasteful and we assume that all agents are optimizers in the economy, Italy stands as the only looser from the …scal consolidations in the medium run, because its consolidation mix relies more heavily on tax hikes. If we are willing to accept that some of the government spending cuts involved goods that are complements to private consumption then the welfare losses from austerity are large for all the countries and Spain is the country that su¤ered the least from these packages because its …scal adjustment were limited. Finally, If we assume that agents are …nancially constrained in these countries as suggested by Martin and Philippon (2014) , then …scal consolidations involve welfare costs for all countries that are higher for Greece and Italy.
Given the recent policy concerns about the reduction of both tax evasion and corruption in Europe and the commitment of politicians to reduce both, we perform a counterfactual exercise in order to evaluate the impact of such reforms on the output, unemployment and welfare losses.
The model predicts that …ghting both public corruption and tax evasion should be at the top of the list of reforms government should pursue in order to reduce the costs of …scal consolidations.
We view our exercise as a …rst attempt in analysing the e¤ects of corruption and tax evasion on the size of the …scal multiplier. Our model is stylistic and we have left out many important aspects that could a¤ect our conclusions. For example, in our economy we consider a representative household and we cannot assess the e¤ects of tax evasion and corruption on income inequality.
Also, we consider only cuts in government consumption expenditures and not in other items of the government budget. Similarly, we consider only hikes in labor income taxes and not in other sources of tax revenue. Furthermore, our framework does not allow for tax evasion on consumption taxes, which is present in many economies. Finally, we do not endogenise the degree of public corruption and we do not interact it with political economy aspects such as the existence of two major predominant parties in the countries under consideration. We leave these issues for future research. 
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B Derivations
B.1 Household' s maximisation problem
We can write in full the Lagrangean for the representative household's maximisation problem.
Firstly, we can incorporate the composition of the household, equation (7), as well as the de…nition of the total e¤ective consumption bundle, directly into the utility function of the household. Then, we can plug the de…nition of the matches m j t = hj t u j t into the law of motion of employment in each sector, and also replace i t in the budget constraint using the law of motion of private capital.
Then we are left with 3 constraints, and the following Lagrangean:
The controls are c t , k t+1 , B t+1 , n F t+1 , n I t+1 , u t and s t . The …rst order conditions are:
B.3 Derivation of the wages
For each sector j = F; I the Nash bargaining problem is to maximize the weighted sum of log surpluses:
where V h n j t and V f n j t are de…ned as:
The …rst order conditions of these optimization problems are:
Plugging the expressions for the value functions into these FOCs, we can rearrange to …nd expressions for w F t and w I t . Using (49), (51) and (53), we can solve for w F t , which yields:
Similarly using (50), (52) and (54), we can solve for w I t , which yields:
C Calibration strategy
We calibrate the model using annual data on the Italian economy over the period 1982-2006.
C.1 Formal Labor market
We calibrate the labor-force participation and the unemployment rates that are related to the formal market to match the observed average values from the data. We set lf n F + u F = 60% 45 and u F lf = 10%. Then using de…nitions we can get:
We …x the separation rate, F , equal to 0:07 and we can derive:
Since there is no exact estimate for the value of the formal vacancy-…lling probability, f F , in the literature, we use what is considered as standard by setting it equal to 0:96. Hence, we can also derive:
We set the matching elasticity with respect to vacancies, 2 , equal to 0:7, close to the estimate for Italy in Peracchi and Viviano (2004) . Then the matching e¢ ciency parameter for the formal sector can be set to satisfy:
C.2 Formal Production
We set the capital depreciation rate, , equal to 0:088. Then we derive i k :
i k = Following the literature, we set the discount factor, , equal to 0:96. Next, we get R: R = 1 and r = R 1 +
The elasticity of demand for intermediate goods, , is set such that the gross steady-state markup, 1 , is equal to 1:25, and the price of the …nal good is normalized to one. Then p x is determined 46 by:
We set the TFP parameter in this sector A F = 1 and the capital share F = 0:34. We set the probability of audit and the fraction of total pro…ts paid as a …ne in the event of an audit as follows: = 0:02, which is close to the value used in Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) , and = 0:3.
Then we can obtain from the …rms'FOC with respect to capital:
From the production function in the regular sector we have:
Using de…nitions we can then obtain:
We set the vacancy costs in the formal sector F = 0:14 and the payroll tax rate s = 0:16 close to the value used in Orsi et al. (2014) . Then we have:
C.3 Informal Production
We set the TFP in the informal sector A I = 0:25 and I = 0:8. Using Istat data we set n I n = 0:13 and we can derive: n I = n I n 1 n I n n F Then by de…nition we have: y I = (A I n I ) 1 I ; y = y F + y I
C.4 Informal Labor Market
We set the exogenous job destruction rate in the informal sector I = 0:0545. We denote by~ I the total steady state separation rate in the underground sector, that is: 
C.5 Fiscal Variables
Next, we set the replacement rate, $ w F , equal to 0:35 close to the estimates in Martin (1996) , also used by Fugazza and Jacques (2004) . Then by de…nition:
We set government spending and the tax rates as follows: g y = 11%, n = 0:4, in line with Orsi et al. (2014) , and c = 0:18. Then by de…nition: g = g y y
We set the steady state debt-to-GDP ratio from the data, b = 103% and using the law of motion of debt-to-GDP we derive 
C.6 Household
We set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1 , equal to 0:5 and the weight of private consumption in e¤ective consumption, 1 = 1 for the case of wasteful government spending. For the case of utility-enhancing spending we set 1 = 0:85 and 2 = 0:25, so that private and public spending are complements. This gives us the consumption bundle by de…nition:
and also:
We then use the following three equations: We set value of leisure in the utility function, ', equal to 2. Then we can derive to satisfy:
= c $ + n F hF l '
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We set the bargaining power parameters in the two sectors to satisfy:
C.7 Other Parameters
The steady state debt-to-GDP target is set equal to the actual debt-to-GDP ratio, b = b = 103%.
In order to achieve a 5% drop in the debt-to-GDP target 10 periods after a shock, we set 1 = 0:85 and 2 = 0:0001. We set the in ‡ation targeting parameter in the Taylor rule, = 1:1, the capital adjustment costs ! = 3 and the price-stickiness parameter = 0:25. Finally, we set the parameters of the …scal policy rule in each case to ensure that we meet the target after 10 periods (see Table   4 ).
